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It is nowadays almost as common to hear ranting about the stupidity 
of belief in the existence of God or ridiculing of New Atheists for their 
lack of philosophical acumen as it is to hear someone complaining 
about the level of so-called God-debate. Kerry Walters belongs to the 
latter group, and he seeks in his book to rehabilitate the God-debate 
by giving philosophical arguments the attention they deserve. This, in 
his view, is lacking in many public debates. For him, the existence of 
God is a metaphysical question and it is not directly linked with how 
believers live their lives and how bogus their practices might be. Walter’s 
position, and the variety of atheism presented here, is thus an instance of 
philosophical atheism. He admits that many people do embrace belief or 
disbelief for reasons that are not reasons at all. For example, disbelief is 
in many cases caused by an unhappy state of affairs, such as unanswered 
prayers, negative experiences of believers, etc. but being a  real atheist 
should include a  rigorously argued philosophical stance. Walters 
recognizes that arguing something rigorously cannot be undertaken in 
less than 200 pages. Therefore, the book is not presented as a systematic 
argument for atheism but rather as a guide to the existing discussions. 
This is an improvement on New Atheist writers who suppose that it is 
possible, or even preferable, for readers to abandon their basic beliefs 
after reading a handful of claims that seem to contradict them.
Atheism begins with a lucid and helpful introduction to worldviews 
and belief-formation which is unfortunately absent from much of 
the contemporary discussion. Walters’s claims that worldviews are 
to a  great extent axiomatic and it is extremely hard for us come up 
with sustained arguments for or against them. We argue from our 
worldviews, not for them.
In order to elucidate the difference between theism and naturalism/
atheism, Walters introduces a distinction between “Spartan” (naturalist) 
and “baroque” (Theist) worldviews. A Spartan worldview is metaphysically 
minimalist, and those trained in Spartan rigour consider it a virtue to 
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have as few metaphysical beliefs as possible in order to avoid possibly 
false beliefs. by contrast, baroque people are flamboyant and less rigid 
about what they consider to be possible and worthy of consideration. 
This is to my view a helpful characterization up to a certain point. Walters’ 
discussion about the general worldview differences seems to boil down to 
claim that theists are willing to entertain questions such as “why is there 
something rather than nothing” while atheists do not consider this to 
be a question worthy of consideration. The crux of the matter lies in the 
fact that we do not seem to have ways for settling the dispute concerning 
whether that question is worth pursuing or not. Thus theism is at least 
initially a possible option and cannot be ruled out a priori.
Walters then goes quickly through some theistic and anti-theistic 
arguments, in order to give a sense of what is currently under discussion 
at a serious philosophical level. However, none of the arguments receive 
thorough treatment. This is the case also with natural explanations of 
religion (marx, Freud, and contemporary evolutionary by-product 
arguments). Walters then briefly discusses the possibility of morality 
and meaning in an atheistic universe. In the section on morality, Walters 
makes a set of interesting distinctions (131). According to him, atheistic 
morality can be “objective” but not “absolute”. This means that values can 
be “rationally grounded” and “non-subjective”, while still being “relative”. 
If I think that p is an objective, rationally grounded and non-subjective 
moral statement, which claims that “it is wrong to torture innocent 
people”, what does it mean that it is at the same time “relative rather 
than absolute”? Walters goes on to state that “[atheistic] values will also 
be flexible enough to take into consideration extenuating circumstances 
arising from context, agent, and situation.” So does this mean that there 
can be extenuating circumstances where p is not true? but this might 
appear to be pushing the meaning of ‘objective’ basically to mean 
‘subjective’. or he might take ‘objective’ to mean ‘inter-subjectivity’, 
which is a  common move in the philosophy of science. In this case 
morality is a communal agreement, which is, of course, better than mere 
idiosyncratic subjectivity but it is not moral realism.
The book ends with a  treatment of atheistic spirituality, which 
Walter’s defines as a  “sense of interconnectedness and unity with all 
of creation”. Walters thinks that this spiritual sphere is the place where 
rapprochement between theism and atheism can take place. The book 
ends with a hopeful note that both sides of the debate could learn from 
each other and benefit from each other’s criticisms.
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regarding the general subject matter and arguments, Walters seems 
to think that the evidence game ends in a stalemate, and this holds for 
both theistic and anti-theistic alternatives. Philosophical inquiry leaves 
us with multiple worldview choices: Atheists do not seem to have enough 
philosophical leverage to convert theists, and vice versa.
In the end atheism seems to be a lifestyle choice that involves some 
epistemic considerations but is not exhausted by them. being an atheist 
boils down to aesthetic considerations: it is a way of keeping your belief 
system simple (a  way that can be contested on at least relatively good 
grounds). one person likes vanilla, while the other prefers triple chocolate 
with macadamias, but it is better to stay with vanilla because it is simpler.
Walters’s book is a call for respecting dialogue. And indeed, the second 
book considered in this review aims to further precisely that. Divine Evil 
is a collection of essays based on a conference held at the university of 
Notre Dame in 2009. The conference brought together leading Christian 
philosophers (Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, eleanor Stump, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, richard Swinburne, mark C. murphy, John Hare) 
and biblical scholars (Gary Anderson, Christopher Seitz) to debate atheist/
agnostic philosophers (evan Fales, edwin Curley, louise Antony, Paul 
Draper, Wes morriston, James l. Crenshaw) about the moral character 
of God as it is presented to us in the pages of Hebrew bible. With this 
kind of line-up you can expect a serious and interesting confrontation. 
The chosen theme incited heated responses during the conference itself 
(at which the author of this review was present), although the written 
contributions by contrast are (somewhat) more toned down. When 
the basic text is the Hebrew bible, and especially its goriest narratives, 
tempers tend to rise. After all, people are discussing the meaning of the 
grounding documents of tradition they deeply love – or hate.
The approach in Divine Evil is quite distinct from Walters’s more 
impersonal treatment. In many of the contributions by atheists moral 
anger towards God is clearly visible. Interestingly, recent studies in 
the psychology of religion (by e.g. Julie exline & Alyce martin) have 
demonstrated that atheists and agnostics, or those who are simply 
undecided, report more anger toward God than openly religious people. 
many interpretations of these results are possible here. Are atheists 
simply saner and morally more robust than theists? Does faith involve 
some kind of naïveté or sacrifium intellectus and harmonization that 
denies the existence of divine evil that lurks in those pages? Are atheists 
angry because they are atheists, or atheists because they are angry? These 
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questions are not, of course, addressed in the book, but they give an extra 
angle how to read the contributions.
obviously, one can form an argument based on moral outrage which 
might argue against theism from fact that the God of the Hebrew bible 
is a “sadist bastard”, “abuser”, “sociopath”, “incompetent”, “uncaring”, and 
a  “monster” (just to quote some of the non-standard divine attributes 
that appear in the volume). From this basis it could be said that the bible 
and its subsequent traditions are simply reprehensible since the source 
code is corrupted to the core. As evan Fales plainly puts it: “I have offered 
an argument from the moral knowledge we share to the conclusion that 
any sacred text that is morally depraved is either no genuine revelation 
at all, or reveals the character of a god unworthy of worship. Such a god 
is moreover not merely unworthy of worship, but deserving of moral 
censure. We have a duty to repudiate such a god.” (107) edwin Curley 
takes this is a bit further claiming, “[i]f it [the bible] was written under 
divine inspiration, God must have wanted to mislead us, either about his 
moral nature, or about the difference between right and wrong. but that 
cannot be. So the bible was not written under divine inspiration.” (62)
Several of the atheist contributions concentrate on identifying the 
most objectionable narratives in the book and employing them in 
the  arguments described above. The theist’s responses basically follow 
three different forms. First, they can deny the factuality of the event, or 
literal interpretation of the text describing the event (e.g., Wolterstorff, 
Anderson). Second they may simply refer to the differing moral 
intuitions along the lines of skeptical theism (e.g., Stump, Plantinga). 
Third, they may offer some kind of reason why a  certain atrocity was 
within the boundaries of God’s goodness to perform or allow (e.g., 
murphy, Swinburne).
The sequence of essays consists of main paper, comments, and short 
reply to the comments. This enables useful and extended exchange of 
thoughts, while always falling short of reaching any kind of agreement.
A  significant reason for disagreement on this topic seems to be 
the literary genre and the degree of factitiousness of the relevant old 
Testament narratives. In his essay, Wolterstorff argues that Joshua 
should be read as intended fiction, not as a  historical account of the 
history of ancient Israel. The accounts of killing the Canaanites should 
be understood as after-the-event utterances similar to “we crushed 
them” –style boasting after winning a  football game. Anderson and 
Stump, among others, suggest that these stories should be read within 
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a  larger canonical context, which makes them to some extent more 
understandable from a  modern perspective. However, not even the 
Christians seem to agree about how the ‘horrors’ should be understood. 
Still, the exegetical remarks are important in this context. It is too easy 
simply to cite passages, or even consistent themes, and then express moral 
anger because they do not seem to stand up to one’s ideals of justice. The 
problem, however, is that an atheist does not, and cannot, recognize any 
kind of canonical reading or sustained narrative that might give at least 
some kind of meaning to the events. Thus, the general pattern is that 
an atheist cites a passage where something horrible happens and argues 
that the bible cannot be considered as a  source for any kind of moral 
worldview. Theists then go on to respond that the bible should be seen as 
a whole and as a narrative. but from the atheist perspective this is already 
too much to ask for.
A word about the moral outrage: In the Hebrew bible, Jahve seems to 
play according to the standard evolutionary fitness rules: protect the in-
group and engage in out-group hostilities if the in-group is threatened. 
The garden-variety atheist can object here that the theist somehow 
invents a  deity that claims to be perfectly loving but this deity is not 
the God of the bible who is, if not perfectly, at least to a  great extent 
morally suspicious and Janus-faced. The theists’ crime is to be more 
moral than their founding documents allow them to be, and/or blind 
to the corruption in their own tradition. Yet, as van Inwagen points out, 
this moral outrage of atheists owes a great deal to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Despite the ‘horrors’ of the Hebrew bible, somehow the 
altruistic morality we now cherish so dearly (at least outwardly, if not 
always in deed) grew out from this tradition. In his contribution, van 
Inwagen suggests that instead of as a moral sourcebook the bible should 
be read as a  sort of coming-of-age-story. Curley greets this as a  very 
welcome critical attitude towards the scriptures (calling van Inwagen 
“an unexpected ally”) but remains in doubt whether van Inwagen’s co-
religionists will accept his moderate views.
Generally the book serves a number of good purposes. It is one of 
the very few manuscripts that record extended exchange between theists 
and atheists on central matters of Judeo-Christian religion. This way it 
witnesses both to the need for this kind of exchange and the difficulties 
that people coming with different worldview assumptions have when they 
try to understand each other. In particular, seeing the (suppressed) anger 
and emotion, which is usually absent from purely academic exercises, 
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can be an eye-opener. Secondly, the book offers good treatments of the 
several problematic passages in the old Testament, and, although no 
certain answers are given, the different examinations should give us all 
a  lot of think about. Thirdly, several essays illustrate that the angle or 
narrative from which we read the text does have a great effect on how we 
perceive those texts. This is especially apparent in Stump’s contributions, 
and these themes are further developed in her new monumental book 
on the problem of suffering (Wandering in Darkness, ouP 2010).
The book ends with a  remarkable essay by Howard Wettstein who 
tries to summarize the previous exchanges. He agrees with the atheists 
that making apologies for Jahve might not be good idea. Still, he resists 
the idea that we should somehow erase those passages in the bible that 
shock us. This would, in his view, be a great loss for all. For example, 
thinking about the story of Abraham, Wettstein’s comments are worth 
citing in length:
Abraham, I want to propose, does not decide to obey God; not that 
he decides against it. Nor is this indecision. Abraham holds in his 
hands two incompatible non-negotiable loves, two non-negotiable 
commitments–commitments do not go any deeper than these–
towards God and towards his son. Nor does Abraham, I’m imagining, 
have any conception of what it would mean to prioritize such 
commitments. The idea of making such a choice boggles the mind. 
There is almost something obscene about it. The text, strikingly spare, 
invites us to imagine Abraham’s reaction. How could he not have been 
feeling alone in the universe? It must have been a  long and lonely 
night. As I imagine his response the next morning–all one can do is 
dwell in the language, letting it seep in–what he does is to proceed, 
to march resolutely ahead, his eyes fixed, together (the Hebrew 
yachdav, repeated several times, suggests intimate togetherness) 
with his beloved son. Abrahams transcendent faith is exhibited in 
his ability to  so march forward, not knowing where the path will 
lead, but ready to follow it, with confidence that he will know what 
to do when he has to. To withstand any such an experience must be 
transformative. And sometimes, as the text perhaps suggests, one 
comes out of the other end having survived that ordeal, loves intact, 
having grown in ways otherwise unavailable. (329)
After reading the interpretations of the old Testament ‘horrors’ from 
both sides, and having witnessed the failures to communicate one’s 
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perspectives, it might seem imprudent to say that it may paradoxically 
be these kinds of passages where the possibility of agreement lies. I am 
thinking especially Wettstein’s accounts of the old Testament, and how 
he succeeds in seeing the existential element in those stories, which is 
common, if not for all, at least for many of us. (For example, I think that 
the story of Abraham and Isaac speaks very differently to a mother who 
has to send her son to war compared to a  person who does not have 
experiences of personal loss). Here it is easy for one to find resonances 
with what Walters writes in his book about atheist spirituality. Yet, in the 
end, there can be no ultimate agreement, but hoping for understanding 
might not be that far-fetched, and that is something that we can experience 
in purely philosophical encounters between theists and atheists, where 
distancing oneself from the subject matter is possible. Nevertheless, 
there is something that haunts us, beyond the level of mere arguments. 
And here some atheists might agree with the note on which Wettstein 
ends the book: “better to suffer in confusion about God, an appropriate 
state for us if not a pleasurable one, than to forgo these stories.” (333)
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What exactly is philosophy of religion? Can we answer this 
question without considering the history of thought on the issue? 
These are some of the main questions that Vladimir Shokhin (the 
Chair of Philosophy of religion at the Institute of Philosophy of 
the russian Academy of Sciences and Professor of Philosophy at the 
moscow State university) addresses in his book. He argues that in virtue 
of the self-reflective character of philosophy in general, philosophy of 
religion, in particular, should reflect on the history of its formation.
However, historical reflection may pursue two different tasks: the 
archeological reconstruction of the thought of the past and the selection 
of philosophically relevant aspects of historical heritage. It is the second 
